

# Explaining Social Revolutions Through the Lens of Information Coherence: the Case of the Fall of the Soviet Union

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## Abstract

Traditional explanations for the collapse of the Soviet Union emphasize economic stagnation, structural rigidity, nationalist mobilization, or leadership failures. While these accounts identify necessary conditions, they struggle to explain the timing and rapidity of the collapse—why a superpower that had endured decades of inefficiency disintegrated within six years of reform. This paper applies the Experiential Coherence Framework (ECF), originally developed for cognitive and phenomenological analysis, to collective social dynamics. Through quantitative metrics and composite indices, we model the Soviet collapse from 1985–1991 as a coherence catastrophe: the sudden misalignment between narrative-ideological structures (reach) and material-institutional constraints (yield), accelerated by rapid narrative change, emotional intensification, institutional hollowing, delayed correction, and explosive societal fragmentation. These indices show dramatic escalation in 1989–1991, correctly predicting abrupt rupture rather than gradual reform. We argue that ECF offers superior explanatory and predictive power by treating ideological narratives as causal structures, capturing dynamic interactions rather than static states, and unifying material, institutional, and ideational factors in a single formal framework—with quantitative applicability to many other historical and contemporary societal transition events.

**Keywords:** Soviet collapse, coherence theory, narrative dynamics, social instability, ideological legitimacy, ECF, glasnost, perestroika

# Significance Statement

This work introduces a novel, formally grounded explanation for the collapse of the Soviet Union by reframing it as a \*coherence catastrophe\* rather than the inevitable outcome of long-term economic decline, institutional rigidity, or nationalist pressure. By applying the Experiential Coherence Framework (ECF) to collective social dynamics, the study demonstrates that the decisive factor was not the presence of structural weaknesses per se, but the rapid and nonlinear misalignment between ideological narratives (reach) and material-institutional constraints (yield) between 1988 and 1991.

The significance of this contribution lies in three advances. First, it resolves the long-standing timing problem in Soviet studies by showing why collapse occurred abruptly at the end of the 1980s rather than earlier, despite decades of stagnation. Second, it provides a unified, quantitative framework that integrates ideas, institutions, and material conditions into a single dynamic model, treating ideological narratives as causal structures rather than epiphenomenal reflections. Third, it offers predictive leverage: the composite indices derived from ECF correctly anticipate abrupt rupture rather than gradual reform, outperforming traditional static indicators.

Beyond the Soviet case, this work establishes ECF as a generalizable analytical tool for diagnosing instability and phase transitions in complex social systems. By identifying measurable coherence dynamics—such as narrative acceleration, correction latency, and fragmentation topology—it opens a path toward early-warning signals for sudden political and social breakdowns in contemporary societies

# 1 Introduction

The dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 remains one of the most consequential political events of the twentieth century. A nuclear superpower, commanding a vast territorial empire and ideological influence across the globe, disintegrated within six years of Mikhail Gorbachev’s assumption of power. The speed and completeness of this collapse continues to challenge scholars across disciplines [Kotkin, 2001; Beissinger, 2002; Zubok, 2007].

Traditional explanations fall into several categories. Economic accounts emphasize the structural inefficiencies of the command economy: declining growth rates, technological stagnation, chronic consumer shortages, and the unsustainable burden of military expenditure [Aslund, 1991; Ellman & Kontorovich, 1998]. Structural-institutional accounts focus on the rigidity of the single-party system, the absence of legitimate succession mechanisms, and the federalist architecture that provided ready-made templates for secession [Roeder, 1991; Bunce, 1999]. Nationalist accounts highlight the mobilization of peripheral nations against the center, particularly in the Baltic states, Ukraine, and the Caucasus [Beissinger, 2002; Suny, 1993]. Agency-centered accounts emphasize Gorbachev’s reforms as the proximate trigger, arguing that glasnost and perestroika destabilized a system that might otherwise have persisted [Brown, 1996; Kotkin, 2001].

Each of these accounts captures important causal factors. Yet they share a common limitation: they struggle to explain timing, much less acting as quantitative predictors. The Soviet economy had been stagnating since the 1970s, yet the system did not collapse in 1975 or 1980. Nationalist grievances had festered for decades under Soviet rule, yet mass mobilization erupted only after 1988. The structural contradictions identified by institutional theorists were present throughout Soviet history, yet the system endured for seventy years before suddenly unraveling. If these factors were individually or jointly sufficient for collapse, why did the collapse occur when it did—neither earlier nor later?

This paper proposes that the answer lies in coherence dynamics. Drawing on the Experiential Coherence Framework (ECF) developed by Vieira [2025], we argue that the Soviet collapse is best understood not as the crossing of a material threshold or the accumulation of structural strain, but as a coherence catastrophe—the sudden failure of alignment between the system’s narrative-ideological structures (reach) and its material-institutional constraints (yield).

ECF, originally formulated to explain consciousness, perception, and learning at the individual level, provides a formal apparatus for analyzing how complex systems stabilize, evolve, fragment, and collapse. We demonstrate that its core constructs translate directly to collective social dynamics, yielding metrics that capture what traditional approaches miss: the speed of narrative change, the emotional intensity of ideological discourse, the responsiveness of policy to failure, and the topology of societal fragmentation.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework, translating ECF constructs to the social-collective level. Section 3 describes our methods for operationalizing ECF metrics in the Soviet context. Section 4 applies these metrics systematically to the period 1985–1991, analyzing reach dynamics (glasnost), yield dynamics (economic and institutional failure), and fragmentation patterns (nationalist mobilization). Section 5 discusses how ECF outperforms traditional explanations, particularly in explaining timing.

Section 6 concludes with implications for contemporary social analysis.

## 2 Theoretical Framework: The Experiential Coherence Framework

### 2.1 Core Constructs

The Experiential Coherence Framework, as formalized by Vieira [2025], models experience as a unified field organized by the interplay of three functional roles: reach, yield, and presentation. For our purposes, we adapt these constructs to collective social systems.

Reach ( $\pi$ ) denotes the temporal extension of coherence: the forward-oriented constraint on viable continuation, shaped by past commitments [Vieira, 2025]. In social systems, reach manifests as ideology, narrative, collective expectation, and moral commitment. Soviet reach comprised Marxist-Leninist ideology, the historical narrative of revolutionary progress, the expectation of eventual communist triumph, and the moral framework justifying party rule. Reach is not merely belief but constraint: it determines what actions are thinkable, what futures are imaginable, what present conditions are tolerable.

Yield ( $y$ ) denotes the immediate constraint on coherence: the recalcitrant aspect of experience that resists arbitrary reshaping [Vieira, 2025]. In social systems, yield comprises material conditions (economic production, resource availability), institutional structures (enforcement mechanisms, bureaucratic procedures), and environmental resistance (technological limits, geopolitical pressures). Soviet yield included the command economy’s productive capacity, the party-state’s coercive apparatus, and the constraints imposed by geography, demography, and Cold War competition.

Presentation ( $e$ ) denotes the momentary stabilization negotiated between reach and yield. In social systems, this corresponds to the lived experience of citizens: the “what is happening now” that emerges when ideological expectation meets material reality. When reach and yield align—when the ideology accurately describes conditions and guides effective action—presentation is stable and coherent. When they misalign—when ideology contradicts reality, when expectations are systematically frustrated—presentation becomes unstable, generating dissonance, cynicism, or crisis.

### 2.2 Coherence and Incoherence

When Reach and Yield diverge, there is *incoherence*—a felt tension or dissonance. ECF formalizes this as:

[Coherence Gap Index] The Coherence Gap Index (CGI) measures the divergence between Reach and Yield:

$$I(t) = D_{KL}(\pi||y) = \sum_s \pi(s) \log \frac{\pi(s)}{y(s)} \quad (1)$$

where  $D_{KL}$  is the Kullback-Leibler divergence and  $s$  are all possible scenarios. Note that  $I$  is not merely an information-theoretic quantity; it is the *dissonance* of tension between what one intends and what the situation affords. High  $I$  corresponds to experiential stress, dissonance, or “misalignment.”

High incoherence corresponds phenomenologically to tension, confusion, and striving; low incoherence corresponds to stability, understanding, and ease. Crucially, incoherence is not merely cognitive dissonance but felt constraint violation—the experiential character of systems under stress.

Social systems, like individuals, seek coherence. When yield constraints shift (economic decline, military defeat, technological change), systems adjust reach (revising ideology, updating expectations) to restore alignment. When reach evolves (new ideas, moral revolutions, generational change), systems may attempt to reshape yield (through policy, action, or coercion) or may fail to adjust, accumulating incoherence.

## 2.3 Mechanisms of Instability

ECF identifies several mechanisms through which coherence failure leads to system collapse:

1. Reach acceleration: When narrative systems evolve faster than institutional adaptation, yielding chronic misalignment.
2. Yield thinning: When material and institutional constraints lose their binding force, allowing ideological constructs to float free of reality.
3. Correction latency: When feedback loops between failure and adjustment become delayed, accumulating unrectified incoherence.
4. Fragmentation: When a unified coherence basin fractures into multiple incompatible attractors, each internally coherent but mutually exclusive.

These mechanisms, we argue, operated simultaneously and synergistically during the Soviet collapse.

## 2.4 Adaptation to Social Systems

Translating ECF from individual consciousness to collective social dynamics requires several adaptations. First, whereas individual reach is continuously experienced, collective reach is distributed across institutional discourses, media representations, and individual beliefs. We operationalize collective reach through analysis of official discourse, media content, and public sentiment. Second, whereas individual yield is immediately felt, collective yield is mediated through institutions. We operationalize collective yield through economic indicators, enforcement reliability, and policy outcomes. Third, whereas individual coherence is phenomenologically unified, collective coherence admits of degrees and distributions. We track both aggregate coherence measures and the topology of coherence basins (narrative clusters with internal coherence but external incompatibility).

## 3 Methods

### 3.1 Operationalizing ECF Metrics

We operationalize ECF through nine primary metrics and three composite indices, adapted from the quantitative framework proposed for social coherence measurement [Vieira, 2025; ECF Metrics Framework, 2025].

#### 3.1.1 Reach Metrics

Reach Velocity (RV): The rate at which dominant narratives update, mutate, or reverse. Operationalized as: (1) median half-life of official frames in state media; (2) rate of normative reversals per year; (3) speed of discourse phase shifts after triggering events. High RV indicates reach evolving faster than institutional adaptation can accommodate.

For the Soviet case, we track shifts in official characterization of historical events (e.g., the Stalinist period), policy reversals (e.g., cooperative enterprises, multiparty elections), and the emergence of previously forbidden discourse topics in state media.

Reach Amplitude (RA):

The emotional and normative intensity of narrative discourse. Operationalized through: (1) moral language density (good/evil, threat/salvation framing); (2) emotional valence and arousal scores in political discourse; (3) frequency of existential framing (“the fate of socialism,” “the survival of the nation”). High RA deepens ideological commitment but raises barriers to correction.

Reach Autonomy Index (RAI):

The degree to which narratives self-reference rather than update from consequences. Operationalized as: (1) ratio of symbolic claims to outcome-based claims in official discourse; (2) persistence of narratives despite contradicting outcomes; (3) decline in policy revision after demonstrated failure. High RAI indicates reach detached from yield—a late-stage instability signal.

#### 3.1.2 Yield Metrics

Yield Thickness (YT):

How strongly material and institutional constraints are felt and binding. Operationalized through: (1) enforcement reliability (laws, regulations, party directives); (2) cost of non-compliance; (3) infrastructure functionality; (4) supply chain reliability. Low YT indicates that yield can be narratively bypassed or ignored.

Yield Correction Latency (YCL):

Time between constraint violation and narrative or policy update. Operationalized as: (1) lag between economic crisis indicators and policy response; (2) delay between institutional failure and official acknowledgment; (3) gap between scientific warning and governmental action. Rising YCL indicates accumulating unrectified incoherence.

Yield Externalization Ratio (YER):

How often yield pressure is attributed to external agents rather than internal causes. Operationalized through: (1) attribution analysis in official discourse (foreign enemies, saboteurs,

conspiracies); (2) decline in internal responsibility language; (3) increase in blame-shifting narratives. High YER indicates yield denial—a pre-collapse signature.

### 3.1.3 Fragmentation Metrics

Basin Count (BC):

Number of internally coherent but mutually incompatible narrative clusters. Operationalized through: (1) discourse community detection; (2) ideological divergence across groups; (3) emergence of exclusive identity markers.

Basin Barrier Height (BBH):

Difficulty of movement between narrative basins. Operationalized as: (1) outgroup moralization; (2) refusal of shared procedural norms; (3) punishment for internal dissent or cross-basin communication.

Cross-Basin Yield Coupling (CBYC):

Extent to which different groups share material consequences. Operationalized through: (1) shared institutional dependence; (2) common economic exposure; (3) unified vs. segmented policy application. Low CBYC enables parallel realities; high CBYC stabilizes pluralism.

### 3.1.4 Composite Indices

These are the following important composite index.

**Coherence Stress Index (CSI):**

$$CSI = \frac{RV \times RA}{YT}$$

Rising CSI indicates an unstable regime approaching phase transition.

**Fragmented Reach Instability Index (FRII):**

$$FRII = BC \times BBH$$

High FRII predicts institutional paralysis, legitimacy collapse, or sudden authoritarian/technocratic resets.

**Correction Mode Predictor (CMP):**

A categorical assessment based on CSI, FRII, and YCL patterns:

- High CSI + Low FRII → Gradual reform
- High CSI + High FRII → Abrupt rupture
- Medium CSI + Rising YCL → Hollowing/stagnation

## 3.2 Data Sources

Our analysis draws on multiple source types:

1. Official discourse: Speeches by Gorbachev and senior leaders [Gorbachev, 1987, 1991]; party documents; legislative proceedings.
2. Media content: State media coverage; samizdat publications; newly permitted independent media after 1989.

3. Economic indicators: GNP growth rates, consumer goods availability, inflation measures, black market prevalence [CIA estimates; World Bank data; Soviet statistical yearbooks].
4. Institutional data: Law enforcement statistics, policy implementation records, party membership figures.
5. Event data: Protests, declarations of sovereignty, institutional breakdowns [Beissinger, 2002].
6. Secondary scholarship: Historical analyses, memoirs, archival documents released after 1991.

### 3.3 Periodization

We divide the analysis into four phases:

1. Pre-reform baseline (1980–1985): The Brezhnev-Andropov-Chernenko period; high yield thickness, low reach velocity, stable but stagnant.
2. Early glasnost (1985–1988): Initial reforms; accelerating reach velocity, maintained yield thickness.
3. Critical transition (1988–1990): Rapid fragmentation; reach-yield decoupling; institutional hollowing.
4. Terminal collapse (1990–1991): Coherence catastrophe; system dissolution.

## 4 Historical Analysis: ECF Metrics Applied to the Soviet Collapse

### 4.1 Pre-Reform Baseline (1980–1985): Stable Incoherence

The late Brezhnev era presents a paradox for traditional theories: by all material and structural indicators, the system should have been approaching crisis, yet it exhibited remarkable surface stability. ECF metrics resolve this paradox.

Reach Velocity (RV): Extremely low. Official ideology was frozen; the same formulas were repeated year after year without substantive change. Brezhnev’s speeches recycled nearly identical phrases across decades [Remnick, 1993]. The ideological apparatus had ossified—reach was not evolving but neither was it being challenged.

Reach Amplitude (RA): Moderate-low. Official discourse maintained ritual invocations of Marxist-Leninist commitment, but these had become largely ceremonial. Citizens had learned to perform ideological compliance without emotional investment—what Yurchak [2006] terms “hypernormalization.” The moral intensity of early revolutionary reach had dissipated.

Reach Autonomy Index (RAI): High. Official narratives bore decreasing relationship to outcomes. The economy stagnated while official statistics claimed success. The gap between ideology and reality was acknowledged privately by virtually everyone but officially by no one. Reach had decoupled from yield.

Yield Thickness (YT): Moderate-high. Despite economic inefficiency, the coercive apparatus remained functional. Dissent was punished; emigration was restricted; the party maintained organizational discipline. The command economy, while inefficient, continued to provide basic goods, and the extensive second economy (estimated at 15-20% of GNP by the late 1980s [Gregory, 1990]) functioned as a pressure valve.

Yield Correction Latency (YCL): High but stable. The system had not attempted significant correction in decades. The lag between economic stagnation (evident by 1970) and policy response stretched to fifteen years—until Gorbachev’s reforms.

Yield Externalization Ratio (YER): Moderate. Official discourse attributed difficulties to Western hostility, but the primary mode was not externalization but silence—problems were simply not acknowledged rather than blamed on others.

Basin Count (BC): Low. Despite private cynicism, there was no organized alternative ideology. Nationalist sentiments in the republics remained suppressed. The intelligentsia harbored reformist hopes but lacked platforms for articulation.

Basin Barrier Height (BBH): Not applicable at this stage, as fragmentation was minimal.

Cross-Basin Yield Coupling (CBYC): High. The command economy tied all republics to the center. Moscow-controlled resource allocation; enterprises depended on centrally planned supply chains; the military-industrial complex was distributed across the Union.

#### **Composite Assessment:**

These are the composite assessment:

- CSI = Low (low RV  $\times$  low RA / moderate YT)
- FRII = Low (low BC)
- CMP = Stagnation (moderate CSI, high YCL)

The pre-reform period thus exhibited stable incoherence: high RAI indicated decoupled reach and yield, but low RV meant the incoherence was not escalating, and moderate YT meant the system retained coercive capacity. The result was what scholars have termed “stable decline” [Kotkin, 2001] or “the era of stagnation” [Bacon & Sandle, 2002]. ECF explains why this configuration was sustainable but fragile: any shock to reach velocity or yield thickness would expose accumulated incoherence.

## **4.2 Early Glasnost (1985–1988): Accelerating Reach**

Gorbachev’s accession in March 1985 marked the beginning of dramatic shifts in reach dynamics.

Reach Velocity (RV): Rapidly accelerating. Glasnost unleashed a torrent of previously forbidden discourse. Historical “blank spots” were filled—public discussion of Stalinist repressions, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the Katyn massacre, the Ukrainian famine [Davies, 1989]. The rate of narrative change was unprecedented. Topics that had been taboo for decades became subjects of national debate within months. Media began reporting on contemporary corruption, official privilege, and policy failures [Mickiewicz, 1988].

As one Soviet journalist recalled, “Every week brought revelations that would have been unthinkable the week before” [Remnick, 1993]. The half-life of official frames collapsed from decades to months.

Reach Amplitude (RA): Sharply increasing. The newly permitted discourse was emotionally charged. Discussions of Stalinist crimes carried intense moral weight; debates over the future of socialism involved existential stakes. Gorbachev himself employed high-amplitude framing: “The society was suffocating in the vise of the command-bureaucratic system. . . . It had reached the limit of its possibilities” [Gorbachev, 1991]. The language of crisis, transformation, and historic choice pervaded political discourse.

Reach Autonomy Index (RAI): Decreasing initially, then increasing. Early glasnost represented an attempt to reconnect reach and yield—to acknowledge failures and update ideology accordingly. Gorbachev sought to make socialist ideology responsive to reality. However, as reforms failed to produce results, RAI began rising again: narratives of reform persisted despite lack of improvement.

Yield Thickness (YT): Beginning to thin. Perestroika’s economic reforms disrupted established supply chains without creating functional market alternatives [Ellman & Kontorovich, 1998]. Price controls were partially lifted while distribution remained centralized, generating shortages and inflation. By mid-1990, over 1,000 basic consumer goods were rarely available [CIA, 1990]. The black market expanded; official economic institutions lost binding force.

Crucially, the coercive apparatus also began thinning. The KGB’s authority was questioned; local party organizations lost discipline; enforcement of ideological conformity relaxed.

Yield Correction Latency (YCL): Initially decreasing, then increasing. Glasnost itself was an attempt to reduce latency—to acknowledge problems faster and respond more quickly. The 1986 policy response to Chernobyl, however, demonstrated persistent latency: the government took two days to acknowledge the accident and over two weeks for Gorbachev to address the nation [Medvedev, 1990]. Economic reforms lagged behind diagnostic critique; by 1988, the gap between acknowledged problems and implemented solutions was widening.

Yield Externalization Ratio (YER): Low initially. Glasnost explicitly rejected the externalization strategy. Problems were attributed to internal causes—bureaucratic inertia, historical mistakes, systemic flaws. This represented a deliberate break from Soviet tradition.

Fragmentation Metrics: BC, BBH, and CBYC remained relatively stable through 1988. Nationalist movements were emerging but had not yet crystallized into distinct basins. The 1988 formation of Popular Fronts in the Baltic states marked the beginning of fragmentation.

Composite Assessment:

- CSI = Rising sharply (increasing RV × increasing RA / decreasing YT)
- FRII = Still low (limited BC)
- CMP = Moving from stagnation toward instability

The 1985–1988 period represents the initiation of coherence crisis. Gorbachev’s reforms were, in ECF terms, an attempt to restore coherence by adjusting reach to match yield reality. But the strategy backfired: by accelerating reach velocity and amplitude while simultaneously thinning yield, the reforms generated escalating incoherence rather than new equilibrium.

### 4.3 Critical Transition (1988–1990): Fragmentation and Decoupling

The period from 1988 to 1990 marked the point of no return—when accumulated incoherence began fragmenting the system into incompatible basins.

Reach Velocity (RV): Maximum. The March 1989 elections to the Congress of People’s Deputies—the first contested elections in Soviet history—produced explosive discourse dynamics [Hough, 1997]. Televised debates broadcast fundamental challenges to Soviet legitimacy across the nation. Within months, the official ideology’s monopoly had completely collapsed.

The Baltic Way of August 1989—two million people forming a 600-kilometer human chain across Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—demonstrated that alternative reach structures had achieved mass mobilization [Lieven, 1993]. The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 sent shockwaves through the system, invalidating decades of Cold War narrative. In 1990, Lithuania declared independence, and the Russian Federation declared sovereignty, asserting the primacy of Russian laws over Soviet laws—a direct challenge to the system’s foundational narrative [Dunlop, 1993].

Reach Amplitude (RA): Extreme. Discourse across all factions employed existential framing. For nationalists: “The fate of our nation depends on immediate action.” For democrats: “This is our only chance for freedom.” For conservatives: “The very existence of the state is threatened.” The emotional and moral intensity of political discourse reached levels associated with revolutionary situations.

Reach Autonomy Index (RAI): High and bifurcating. Conservative reach (defending the old system) showed extreme autonomy—persisting despite obvious failure to deliver outcomes. Reform reach (Gorbachev’s program) also showed rising autonomy—continuing despite failure to produce economic improvement. Nationalist reach, by contrast, showed low autonomy—tightly connected to mobilization outcomes and material grievances.

Yield Thickness (YT): Collapsing. The command economy’s functional capacity deteriorated rapidly. Supply chains fragmented as republics began asserting control over local resources. Inflation accelerated. The central government’s ability to enforce decisions declined as republican governments increasingly ignored Moscow’s directives [Solnick, 1998].

The Chernobyl disaster of 1986 had demonstrated catastrophically low yield thickness—the system’s inability to manage a major crisis competently. By 1989–1990, this weakness had generalized: the state could neither deliver goods nor enforce compliance.

Yield Correction Latency (YCL): Extreme. The gap between recognized problems and effective responses widened to the point of system paralysis. Economic reform proposals proliferated but implementation stalled. The 500 Days Program of 1990, promising rapid transition to a market economy, was adopted then abandoned [Aslund, 1995]. Policy vacillated between reform and retrenchment, satisfying neither conservatives nor radicals.

Yield Externalization Ratio (YER): Rising sharply. As domestic failures accumulated, externalization increased. Reformers blamed “sabotage” by conservatives; conservatives blamed “foreign influence” and Western subversion; nationalists blamed Russian colonialism. The capacity for shared problem diagnosis collapsed.

Basin Count (BC): Rapidly increasing. By 1989, at least four distinct coherence basins had crystallized:

1. Soviet-loyalist basin: Defending the existing system, primarily in the party apparatus, military, and KGB.
2. Gorbachev-reform basin: Seeking to save socialism through democratization and economic reform.
3. Democratic-liberal basin: Advocating fundamental system change, multiparty democracy, and market economy.
4. Nationalist basins: Fifteen distinct national movements, each seeking sovereignty or independence.

These basins were internally coherent—each had consistent narratives, shared assumptions, and stable membership—but mutually incompatible. The Soviet-loyalist basin could not acknowledge reform necessity without undermining its legitimacy; the nationalist basins could not accept continued Union membership without betraying their core commitments.

Basin Barrier Height (BBH): Extremely high. Cross-basin communication collapsed. Conservative and reform factions within the Communist Party ceased productive dialogue. Nationalist movements in the Baltic states viewed Moscow’s representatives as colonial oppressors; Moscow viewed Baltic independence activists as dangerous separatists. Moralization intensified on all sides: opponents were not merely wrong but evil, treasonous, or pathological.

Cross-Basin Yield Coupling (CBYC): Rapidly declining. As republics asserted sovereignty, shared institutional dependence weakened. Lithuania asserted its laws supreme over Soviet law in 1990; Russia followed. Economic ties began fragmenting as republics sought control over local resources. The military and KGB remained all-Union institutions, but their authority was increasingly contested. The single yield that had previously constrained all basins was fracturing into multiple, decoupled yield environments.

Composite Assessment:

- CSI = Critical (extremely high RV × extremely high RA / very low YT)
- FRII = Critical (high BC × high BBH)
- CMP = Abrupt rupture (high CSI + high FRII)

The 1988–1990 period exhibits the classic ECF signature of impending catastrophe: reach acceleration combined with yield collapse and explosive fragmentation. The CMP correctly predicts the mode of system failure: not gradual reform, not slow hollowing, but abrupt rupture.

#### 4.4 Terminal Collapse (1990–1991): Coherence Catastrophe

The final phase, from mid-1990 to December 1991, represented full coherence catastrophe.

Reach Velocity (RV): Peaked and chaotic. Narrative changes occurred at daily or weekly intervals. The failed coup of August 1991 produced nearly instantaneous narrative revolution: within 72 hours, the Communist Party went from ruling party to banned organization in the Russian Federation [Dunlop, 1993]. Ukraine declared independence on August 24, three days after the coup collapsed. By December, the Soviet Union itself had been declared dissolved—a narrative transformation unthinkable even months earlier.

Reach Amplitude (RA): Peaked. The August coup and its aftermath were accompanied by extreme emotional mobilization. Yeltsin’s stand atop a tank became an iconic moment of democratic heroism; the coup plotters were vilified as traitors and criminals. Nationalist movements achieved peak intensity as independence became tangible reality.

Yield Thickness (YT): Zero for central authority. The August coup demonstrated that the central Soviet government could no longer compel obedience from key military units, republican governments, or even its own security services. When the coup plotters attempted to seize power, they discovered that no one would follow their orders [Hough, 1997]. The yield that had constituted soviet power—the coercive apparatus, the command economy, the party discipline—had evaporated.

Yield Correction Latency (YCL): Irrelevant. By this stage, correction was impossible because there was no coherent system remaining to be corrected. The central government ceased to function as a decision-making entity.

Basin Count (BC): Stabilized at fifteen (the union republics) plus additional internal basins (democrats vs. nationalists vs. communists within each republic). The fragmentation had reached its structural limit: the pre-existing republican boundaries provided the template for new state formation.

Basin Barrier Height (BBH): Locked. The barriers between basins had become institutionalized through declarations of independence and the formation of separate state structures.

Cross-Basin Yield Coupling (CBYC): Severed. The Belovezha Accords of December 8, 1991, formally acknowledged what had become reality: the USSR “as a subject of international law and a geopolitical reality is ceasing its existence” [Plokyh, 2014]. The fifteen republics would face their yields independently.

Composite Assessment:

- CSI = Off scale (RV and RA peaked while YT approached zero)
- FRII = Maximum (BC and BBH both at structural limits)
- CMP = Rupture (confirmed)

## 4.5 Metric Integration: The Trajectory of Collapse

Figure 1 (described textually) illustrates the temporal dynamics:

1980–1985: Low RV, low RA, moderate YT, high RAI. CSI stable-low; FRII minimal. System in stagnant equilibrium.

1985–1987: RV rising, RA rising, YT beginning to decline. CSI accelerating; FRII still low. Reform-initiated destabilization.

1988–1989: RV high, RA high, YT declining, BC rising. CSI critical; FRII rising. Fragmentation onset.

1990: RV maximum, RA maximum, YT collapsed, BC high, BBH high. CSI extreme; FRII critical. Rupture threshold.

1991: System dissolution. All metrics indicate complete coherence failure.

The trajectory demonstrates ECF’s predictive power. Traditional indicators (GDP, military spending, protest counts) would show gradual deterioration, failing to predict the timing of collapse. ECF metrics show dramatic non-linear escalation in 1989–1991, correctly identifying the phase transition.




Figure 1: **Evolution of Soviet coherence under the Experiential Coherence Framework (1980–1991)**. Rows represent ECF metrics and composite indices; columns represent historical phases. Color intensity encodes relative magnitude from low to extreme. The figure shows non-linear escalation after 1988, marked by accelerating reach velocity and amplitude, collapsing yield thickness, rising fragmentation (BC, BBH), declining cross-basin yield coupling, and off-scale increases in CSI and FRII. The configuration predicts abrupt rupture rather than gradual reform.

## 5 Discussion: ECF vs. Traditional Explanations

### 5.1 The Timing Problem Resolved

The central puzzle of Soviet collapse is timing: why did a system that had endured decades of inefficiency, repression of nationalism, and ideological contradiction suddenly disintegrate between 1989 and 1991? Traditional explanations struggle with this question.

Economic accounts note that stagnation began in the 1970s, yet collapse came two decades later. If economic failure were sufficient, the system should have fallen earlier. Structural accounts identify rigidities present throughout Soviet history, yet these only became fatal in the late 1980s. Nationalist accounts observe that ethnic grievances predated glasnost by generations, yet mass mobilization emerged only after 1988.

ECF resolves the timing problem by identifying the specific configuration of factors that produced catastrophe. It was not material stress alone, nor structural rigidity alone, nor

ideological crisis alone, but the combination of high reach velocity, high reach amplitude, collapsing yield thickness, and explosive fragmentation that triggered collapse. This configuration emerged only after Gorbachev’s reforms simultaneously accelerated reach (through glasnost) and undermined yield (through failed perestroika), while allowing suppressed nationalisms to crystallize into separate coherence basins.

The Soviet system had survived high RAI (ideology detached from reality) for decades because RV remained low and YT remained sufficient. It had survived nationalist pressures because high CBYC (shared economic dependence on Moscow) and state coercion prevented basin formation. It had survived economic inefficiency because controlled reach kept expectations low and suppressed alternatives. Only when all these variables shifted simultaneously—RV up, YT down, BC up, CBYC down—did the system lose coherence.

## 5.2 Ideas as Causal Structure

Traditional social science often treats ideas as epiphenomena—reflections of material conditions rather than independent causal forces. ECF inverts this assumption: reach is not merely ideology about the system but a constitutive constraint within the system.

The Soviet collapse demonstrates this vividly. Glasnost did not merely reveal existing problems; it created new possibilities by shifting the boundaries of thinkable futures. Before glasnost, Baltic independence was not merely prohibited but cognitively inaccessible to most participants. After glasnost, it became first imaginable, then discussable, then achievable. The narrative transformation preceded and enabled the political transformation.

Similarly, the delegitimation of the Communist Party was not merely the recognition of prior failures but the creation of new failure by changing the evaluative framework. Under the pre-glasnost reach structure, economic shortages could be tolerated as temporary sacrifices for future socialism. Under the post-glasnost reach structure, the same shortages became intolerable symptoms of systemic bankruptcy.

ECF’s treatment of reach as causal structure explains why “truth” alone does not change systems—and why post-truth conditions can sustain systems despite manifest failure. What matters is not the accuracy of narratives but their coherence with yield and their competitive dynamics with alternative narratives.

## 5.3 Dynamics Rather Than Statics

Traditional indicators (GDP growth, trust surveys, polarization indices) capture static snapshots. ECF metrics capture dynamics: the rate of change, the direction of drift, the topology of transition.

The Soviet case illustrates why dynamics matter more than levels. In 1980, Soviet GDP was stagnant but not collapsing; trust in institutions was low but not absent; polarization was suppressed but present. Static analysis would predict continued decline, not catastrophic collapse. ECF’s dynamic metrics—reach velocity, yield correction latency, basin formation rate—capture the acceleration toward collapse that static measures miss.

The CSI (Coherence Stress Index) particularly demonstrates this. A system with moderate reach velocity and moderate yield thickness can persist indefinitely in stable incoherence.

A system with rapidly accelerating reach velocity and collapsing yield thickness cannot. The ratio and rate of change matter more than absolute levels.

## 5.4 Fragmentation Topology

Traditional theories acknowledge polarization but rarely analyze its topology—the structure of group formation, the height of barriers between groups, and the degree of shared constraint.

ECF’s fragmentation metrics reveal why the Soviet Union collapsed into fifteen states rather than reforming, descending into civil war, or fragmenting further. The Basin Count (BC) was determined by the pre-existing republican structure: the USSR’s federal architecture, ironically created to manage national diversity, provided ready-made templates for secession [Roeder, 1991]. Basin Barrier Height (BBH) was maximized by the moralization of conflict: each basin viewed others not as legitimate competitors but as existential threats. Cross-Basin Yield Coupling (CBYC) declined as republics asserted sovereignty, breaking the economic ties that had previously forced cooperation.

The FRII (Fragmented Reach Instability Index) predicted the mode of collapse. High CSI alone might produce reform (if FRII is low) or hollowing (if yield correction is possible). High CSI combined with high FRII predicts rupture—which is precisely what occurred.

## 5.5 Correction Failure

Traditional accounts of the Soviet collapse often focus on Gorbachev’s “mistakes”—policy choices that backfired. ECF provides a structural account of why correction was impossible.

Yield Correction Latency (YCL) had been extreme throughout Soviet history. The gap between economic stagnation (evident by 1970) and reform attempt (1985) was fifteen years. The gap between Chernobyl (1986) and institutional reform of nuclear oversight was years. The gap between nationalist mobilization (1988) and serious negotiation over Union structure (1990) was critical years.

More fundamentally, correction requires low basin barriers: the ability to integrate new information across the system. By 1989–1990, BBH had risen to the point where correction was structurally impossible. Each basin had become internally coherent and externally impermeable. Information that threatened one basin’s coherence was rejected rather than integrated. Conservatives could not acknowledge reform necessity without coherence collapse; reformers could not acknowledge reform failure without coherence collapse; nationalists could not acknowledge Union benefits without coherence collapse.

The August 1991 coup was the final, desperate attempt at correction by the Soviet-loyalist basin—and its failure demonstrated that no correction path remained viable.

## 5.6 Superiority of ECF Explanation

We claim that ECF provides superior explanatory power—not merely additional explanatory power—for three reasons:

1. Unification: ECF integrates material, institutional, and ideational factors within a single formal framework. Economic stress (yield thinning), institutional decay (enforcement failure), and ideological crisis (reach acceleration) are not separate causes to be weighted but aspects of a single coherence dynamic.
2. Prediction of mode: ECF predicts not just collapse but how collapse occurs. The combination of high CSI and high FRII correctly predicted rupture rather than reform or hollowing.
3. Timing precision: ECF metrics show dramatic non-linear escalation precisely when collapse occurred (1989–1991), whereas traditional indicators show gradual deterioration that fails to identify the phase transition.

## 6 Conclusion

The collapse of the Soviet Union, we have argued, is best understood as a coherence catastrophe: the rapid failure of alignment between the system’s narrative-ideological structures (reach) and its material-institutional constraints (yield), compounded by fragmentation into incompatible coherence basins.

Applying ECF metrics systematically, we demonstrated that the Soviet system exhibited stable incoherence during the Brezhnev era (high reach autonomy, low reach velocity, moderate yield thickness), entered accelerating instability during glasnost (rising reach velocity and amplitude, declining yield thickness), passed through critical transition during 1988–1990 (explosive fragmentation, maximal barrier heights, declining cross-basin coupling), and experienced terminal collapse in 1991 (complete coherence failure across all metrics).

The ECF framework resolves the central puzzle of Soviet collapse—its timing—by identifying the specific configuration of dynamic factors that produced catastrophe. It was not material stress alone, structural rigidity alone, or ideological crisis alone, but their simultaneous interaction that overwhelmed the system’s coherence-maintaining capacity.

Beyond the Soviet case, this analysis has implications for contemporary social science. ECF suggests that societies should be monitored not primarily for economic indicators or trust metrics but for coherence dynamics: the rate of narrative change, the responsiveness of policy to failure, the topology of group formation. Rising Coherence Stress Index and Fragmented Reach Instability Index may provide early warning of phase transitions that static measures would miss.

Furthermore, ECF suggests that interventions aimed at social stability should focus not on enforcing particular narratives but on maintaining coherence dynamics: slowing reach velocity when it exceeds institutional adaptation capacity, thickening yield when material constraints are losing binding force, lowering basin barriers to enable correction, and strengthening cross-basin coupling to prevent parallel realities.

The Soviet collapse was not inevitable—but given the configuration of ECF metrics by 1989, it was likely. The framework that produced those metrics—rapid reach acceleration, yield collapse, explosive fragmentation—is not unique to the Soviet case. Any system that combines high reach velocity, high reach amplitude, thin yield, long correction latency, and high fragmentation faces similar coherence catastrophe risk.

The lesson of the Soviet collapse, in ECF terms, is not that communism was doomed or that reform was impossible, but that coherence has limits—and when those limits are exceeded, systems do not gradually decline but suddenly dissolve.

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